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Abstract 
The question of the division of cognitive labor (DCL) has given rise to various models 
characterizing the way scientists should distribute their efforts. These models often consider 
the scientific community as a self-governed sphere constituted by rational agents making 
choices on the basis of fixed rules. Such models have recently been criticized for not taking 
into account the real mechanisms of science funding. Hence, the question of the utility of the 
DCL models in guiding science policy remains an open one. In this paper, we show that two 
unconsidered dimensions would have to be taken into account. First, DCL studies miss the 
existence of distinct levels of epistemic objectives organizing the research process. Indeed, 
the scientific field is structured as a system of hierarchical, interconnected practices which are 
defined both by their inherent purposes and by various superposed external functions. Second, 
I criticize the absence of ontological considerations, since the epistemological significance of 
pluralism is highly dependent on the nature of the object under study. Because of these 
missing dimensions, current DCL models might have a limited usefulness to identify good 
practices of research governance.  
 
 
1-Introduction 
How should we allocate resources to scientific research? This question, although old
1
, is of 
growing interest among scientists and policy makers. A current set of concerns revolves 
around the mechanisms of project selection by funding agencies, the role that peer-reviewing 
should play in grant allocation, and the institutional conditions promoting the development of 
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See, for instance, Wilholt and Glimell (2011) for a synthetic historical panorama.  
innovative ideas (e.g Graves et al. 2011; Haufe 2013; Boudreau 2016; Fang and Casadevall 
2016; Vaesen and Katzav 2017
2
). The recent proliferation of proposals to rethink the concrete 
conditions of science funding is strongly motivated by natural scientists themselves, and by 
the literature on the economics of science. But how may philosophy of science and 
epistemology enter these debates? Our paper considers this question by proposing a critical 
assessment of the benefits and limits of the social epistemology models of “division of 
cognitive labor”, when trying to deliver policy advice.  
 
One of the main epistemological questions at stake about the mechanisms of science funding 
concerns the consequences of the institutional arrangements which regulate the allocation of 
resources to scientific research on the growth of knowledge. Formulated as such, our first 
interrogation exhibits its link with what Goldman and Blanchard (2016) defines as the “third 
branch” of social epistemology3. As noted by the authors, this “third branch” largely focuses, 
since Kitcher’s (1990) early work,  on the question of the division of cognitive labor (DCL), 
seeking to describe what might be an optimal division of tasks between competitive 
approaches within a given scientific community, and to assess the institutional conditions 
promoting the achievement of this optimum. More precisely, Kitcher’s (1990) initial question 
is the following: “what is the optimal division of cognitive labor within a scientific field, and 
in what ways do personal epistemic and non-epistemic interests lead us toward or away from 
it?” (p.22). This inquiry was recently renewed by Viola (2015) which asks “(1) which is the 
optimal distribution of cognitive efforts among rival methods within a scientific community? 
and (2) whether and how can a community achieve such an optimal distribution?” (p.1). 
These questions ground an active line of research, mostly dedicated to the development of 
mathematical models. Such models propose solutions to Kitcher’s optimization problem by 
focusing on rewards or credit schemes (e.g Strevens 2003; Zollman 2018), on the cognitive 
structure of the scientific community (e.g Weisberg and Muldoon 2009), or on the effect of 
project selection by centralized funding mechanisms (Avin 2018). Since recently, some of 
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Of course, the question of the governance of science is not limited to that of the processes of grant allocation by 
funding agencies.  Our paper exclusively deals with epistemic considerations, but ethics and political philosophy 
also have their say. The so-called “responsibility” of research and innovation (Arip 2016), and the democratic 
involvement of citizens in science policy decisions (Kitcher 2001) constitute central perspectives on this matter.  
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Devoted to the “assessment of the epistemic consequences of adopting certain institutional arrangements or 
systemic relations as opposed to alternatives”. 
 
these agents-based models manifest an explicit interest in providing concrete policy advice 
(Viola 2018), notably about the modalities of the allocation of resources (Kummerfeld and 
Zollman 2016; Avin 2018) and the cognitive structure of scientific communities (Pöyhönen 
2016). However, this ambition is tempered by the existence of inherent limits to modeling 
activities in social epistemology. As with models designed to describe a domain of the real 
world, it is possible (and welcome) to question the simplifications, idealizations and 
background hypotheses which are susceptible to amend the descriptive and normative value 
of DCL models (Yloski 2014; Pöyhönen 2016). Given the well-recognized difficulties to 
assess the exact benefits and limits of these works, it is then common to note that “there is 
much work left to do” (Muldoon 2013, p. 124) to improve or judge their epistemological and 
political value. The injunctions to prudence in interpreting the results of the DCL models
4
 
raises the question of their exact interest in guiding the institutional regulation of research, 
and notably the mechanisms of grant allocations by funding agencies.  
 
In this paper, we aim at showing that a major threat to the descriptive and normative value of 
current DCL models is a fundamental lack of clarity about the exact object which is divided. 
As we shall see, authors consider without distinctions the allocation of resources to “theories”, 
“approaches”, “methods”, “research programs”, “research projects” etc. By doing so, they 
bypass two important dimensions of the epistemological reflection about the division of 
cognitive labor. First, the epistemic choices made by researchers are determined by a 
hierarchical network of shared objectives, from experimental, technical practices to 
conceptual and representational activities. Second, the significance and the form taken by 
epistemic diversity are highly dependent on the kind of object under study.  Our argument is 
that these elements should be carefully taken into account when building DCL models and 
when interpreting the results obtained. We suggest, based on concrete instances of such social 
epistemology modeling, that the ignorance of these features leads to unsatisfying conclusions 
about the desirable institutional conditions of research. Finally, more than a refinement of the 
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Some instances of this interpretative prudency, among others: “Can our models fix useful concepts and provide 
templates for causal mechanisms that could be at play? Could they be used to help shape the debate around 
emerging policy decisions? The answers will come from future work in the field” (Avin (forth.), p.32); “The 
cautious conclusion to be drawn from these differences is that, in its entirety, the relationship between diversity 
and epistemic performance is likely to be more complex than can be captured by any simple model” (Pöyhönen 
2016, p. 4530); “Of course these models are limited in two critical ways. First, they proceed into idealizations 
about the structure of the scientific community and about individual scientists. Real scientists and scientific 
communities are more complicated than our models, and it is always possible that a critical causal factor has 
been left out” (Zollman 2018, p. 26). 
mathematical models used, what is needed to improve social epistemology insight in research 
policy is a qualitative reflection about the dynamics of scientific progress.  
 
2-DCL models: common architecture 
 
a-A (short) systematic review 
 
Many reviews of the different kinds of works dealing with the DCL problems are available 
(see, for instance, Muldoon 2013; Goldman and Blanchard 2016; Avin (forth.)). Let us 
reiterate here the main directions taken by philosophers interested in this question since 
Kitcher’s (1990) seminal study. The starting point is the idea of a tension, within scientific 
communities, between individual and collective rationality. Kitcher imagines the case of a 
shared objective (for instance, determining the physical structure of a certain molecule), with 
two competitive methods to reach it – method I and method II, method I being known as more 
accurate. For Kitcher, a purely rational epistemic agent will choose method I to solve the 
problem posed. Yet, this behavior does not optimize the division of cognitive labor, which 
would (mathematically) benefit from a more balanced distribution of human resources 
between method I and method II. Kitcher then shows that this idealized community may be 
nearer to the optimum if there exists a reward scheme according a larger reward to scientists 
working on the less popular “research program”. This mechanism will be efficient on the 
condition that scientists do not follow a strictly epistemic rationality, but have other sources of 
motivation (professional credit or rewards). Following this line, Strevens (2003, 2013) 
proposes another reward scheme, based on the “priority rule” according to which the first 
research program that discovers a certain result gets all the reward. Zollman (2018) develops a 
quite distinct mathematical model to assess the effect of the search for professional credit 
(versus the “seek the truth”) on scientific progress.  
Besides rewards and credit, other factors were studied for their ability to optimize the division 
of cognitive labor. Zollman (2010) addresses the formation of consensus on the right theory of 
a given phenomenon. Considering two theories T1 and T2, T1 being favored in the initial 
experiments, he suggests on the basis of historical instances that it may be rational, at the 
scale of a given scientific community, to pursue the poorly justified theory T2 (because T2 
may be, finally, the right one and should not be eliminated too quickly). Using computer 
simulations, he then (not surprisingly) shows that the communication rate between individuals 
influences the collective rationality: structures with less communication may score better in 
choosing the right theory.  
A third kind of factor influencing the division of cognitive labor is mobilized by the epistemic 
landscape models launched by Weisberg and Muldoon (2009). Here, it is the “cognitive 
diversity” which is put to the fore. The authors consider an “epistemic landscape” explored by 
individuals following distinct engagement strategies. This epistemic landscape represents, in a 
three dimensional space, all the “research approaches” possible in a given field of research 
(Pöyhönen 2016), and their respective significance
5. Epistemic agents may adopt a “control” 
engagement strategy (they move in the landscape without taking into account the behavior of 
the other agents), or be “followers” (they adopt the most significant programs explored by 
their predecessors); they also can behave as “Maverick”, and explore unknown zones. The 
idea is then to determine, depending on the initial conditions (size and shapes of the 
landscape) which population, or mix of populations, optimize the division of cognitive labor 
(the cumulated significance of the research process) (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009;  
McKenzie and Himmelreich 2015; Pöyhönen 2016).  
 
All these works share an identical macro-conception of the dynamics of science as a closed 
system internally regulated by an invisible-hands mechanism (Wray 2000). Individual 
scientists are free to choose the direction of their research, in a context of unlimited resources 
(Viola 2015). In particular, there is “no superintendents” (Strevens 2013, p. 21). Against this 
idealization, Viola (2015) insists on the necessity “to consider the role of external social 
factors such as the political decisions to pursue some or other scientific project’’ (p. 9). In 
particular, the role of funding agencies should be explicitly addressed. Following this line, 
Avin (forth.) renews the epistemic landscape model to study the effect of “centralized 
funding” on the division of cognitive labor. He simulates distinct ways of funding science, 
based on the estimated significance of the project (its position on the epistemic landscape), on 
the time passed by the individuals in the system, or on a lottery (random distribution). 
Depending on the size of the epistemic landscape, he shows that the lottery strategy may be 
the best one in terms of cumulative significance of the projects followed.  He concludes that 
dealing with the classical opposition between “plausibility and originality” (Polanyi 1962) or 
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As noticed  by  Pöyhönen (2016),  significance may be understood according to Kitcher (1993) (Chap. 4) and 
Kitcher (2001), as “the significance of the truths that can be uncovered by using this approach” (Pöyhönen 
(2016),  p.4522). 
“exploration and exploitation”, a random allocation of resources may optimize the division of 
cognitive labor. He links this result to more qualitative arguments defending lottery as a good 
way to select projects (Gillies 2014, Fang and Casadevall 2016).  
Let us add, to close this rapid outlook on the DCL models, the work of Kummerfeld and 
Zollman (2016), which aims to quantify the “conservatism” of a scientific community 
constituted by individuals left to “their own devices” (p. 1057).  As Kitcher did, but by using 
more intricate mathematical machinery, they suggest that individual epistemic rationality 
conflates with the optimum division of cognitive labor when individuals have to choose 
between a “risky” and a “safe” alternative. They conclude that the mechanism of grant 
allocation should voluntarily fund a certain amount of “risky” projects, to compensate the 
endogenous “conservatism” of the scientific community.  
 
All these DCL models have a common architecture, that is to say, they share a common 
general formulation of the question of the division of cognitive labor in science, and a 
common scheme to solve it.  The starting point is to consider a certain pre-defined objective O 
to reach, which is shared by a given community. Typically, this objective may be a 
(theoretical, experimental, utilitarian, technical) problem to solve. It may also be, specifically 
in the case of epistemic landscape models, an ensemble of objectives defining a research area. 
The authors then consider the existence of various means Mi to reach O, each of them having 
a utility function quantifying their ability to fulfill O. The central aim is then to distinguish the 
individual instrumental rationality
6
, which tends to maximize the probability, for each 
researcher, to reach O, and other “non-epistemic7” factors, such as the search for rewards or 
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Let us maintain, following Kelly (2003), that instrumental rationality classically designates “the rationality 
which one displays in taking the means to one's ends” (p. 612)”. It is opposed to epistemic rationality, defined as 
“the kind of rationality which ones displays when one believes propositions that are strongly supported by one's 
evidence and refrains from believing propositions that are improbable given one's evidence”. In DCL models, as 
noted by Zollman (2018), epistemic rationality is understood as a form of instrumental rationality: “epistemic 
rationality is a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one’s cognitive or 
epistemic goals” (Kelly (2003), p. 613). In other words, epistemic rationality is expected to be mobilized to 
choose the best alternative (the Mi which has the estimated highest probability to reach O) to solve a cognitive or 
epistemic problem. This instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality corresponds to the multiplicity of the 
(cognitive, practical, utilitarian) kinds of objectives considered in the DCL models.  
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The opposition between “epistemic” and “non-epistemic” factors may be discussed, since the objective of DCL 
models is precisely to show that “non –epistemic” factors positively influence the search for truth. However, the 
rationale behind this distinction lies on a contrast between the motivations guiding the choices made by 
researchers, as well exposed in Zollman (2018).  If these motivations are exclusively those of solving the 
problems posed to the community, they are considered as acting as purely epistemic agents –even if this problem 
is not itself strictly cognitive.  
professional credit, the cognitive features of the individuals or the centralized selection of 
means by funding agencies. The shared general conclusion, since Kitcher’s work, is that 
researchers (or peer-reviewers affiliated to funding bodies) only following individual 
instrumental rationality do not optimize the division of cognitive labor. Indeed, since all 
possible research projects (Mi) have a certain probability to reach O, it is counter-productive 
to concentrate resources only on the most promising approaches. Yet, individual instrumental 
rationality is supposed to generate the phenomenon of herding on secure alternatives. 
Reciprocally, “non-epistemic” factors may positively modify the division of cognitive labor 
by promoting the exploration of more risky alternatives.  
The first step in the elaboration of DCL models is then to define a theoretical optimal 
distribution of resources. This optimal DCL may be mathematically expressed (e.g in Kitcher 
1990; Strevens 2003; Kummerfeld and Zollman 2016), or implicitly fixed by the initial 
conditions chosen. This is the case for the epistemic landscape models, where the pre-
determined form of the landscape determines what would be an optimal distribution of labor 
to explore it given certain initial funding conditions (number of researchers and number of 
projects selected) and respect to a given variable (for instance the cumulative epistemic 
significance reached). 
 
b-What exactly is divided? 
 
Let us specify this general scheme, by addressing a crucial point: what, exactly, is thought to 
be divided? In other words, what are exactly Mi and O? The question is relevant, since the 
authors apply the same schemes to distinct objects. As noted by De Langhe (2014), “Kitcher’s 
basic unit of analysis is “methods,” Strevens uses “research programs,” and Brock and 
Durlauf use “theories.””. He adds: “because as far as their dynamics of adoption are 
concerned the literature uses these concepts interchangeably, I will use only the concept of 
“theories” understood as standards for the division of cognitive labor to which individual 
scientists make contributions” (p. 445, our italics). Kummerfeld and Zollman (2016) 
explicitly recognize this indeterminacy, when they clarify their notion of “general research 
project” by including in it “different theoretical commitments, paradigms, research 
methodologies, treatments strategies in medicine, and so on” (p. 1059). This vagueness of the 
object which is divided is particularly significant in the epistemic landscape models. 
Pöyhönen (2016) explicitly addresses the question of “what does an epistemic landscape 
represent”, and deduces that they are not “a search space for a single problem” (p. 4525). An 
epistemic landscape would stand for a “scientific research topic (e.g synthetic biology, 
astrophysics, endocrinology)”, divided into “different but complementary research 
approaches”. For instance, the authors argues, “attempting to synthesize novel DNA 
nucleotides and studying the stability of these molecules by computational methods are 
independent but both necessary research approaches in synthetic biology” (p. 4523). 
Interestingly, he adds that the “discrete patches” composing the epistemic landscape 
“represent a combination of (i) a research question being investigated, (ii) instruments and 
methods for gathering and analyzing data, and (iii) background theories used to interpret the 
data”. Consequently, as the author confesses himself, “epistemic landscapes underlying real 
scientific research involve a greater number of interdependencies between the elements of 
approaches (question, instrument, methods, theories)” (p. 6).  These precisions are the most 
complete we may find within the literature of epistemic landscape models. The works of 
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) or Avin (forth.) simply consider epistemic landscapes as an 
ensemble of “research approaches” or “projects”.  
 
This diversity of Mi’s nature also reflects in the multiplicity of kinds of objectives O which 
are mobilized as examples illustrating the DCL models. Kitcher (1990) takes the case of the 
elucidation of the physical structure of a given molecule (of medical importance); Zollman 
(2010) that of the explanation of a disease (the peptic ulcers), or more generally that of all 
“truth seeking” objectives (Zollman 2018); Goldman and Blanchard (2016) cites the 
elucidation of the structure of the DNA; Pöyhönen (2016) considers “the study of opioid 
receptors in chemical biology, or critical phenomena in statistical physics” (p. 4530) etc.  
 
What we want to show in the next section is that because of the interchangeable use of distinct 
kinds of ends and means, two important dimensions of the dynamics of scientific progress are 
absent from the DCL models. Then, in the third section, I will suggest that these absent 
dimensions are missing dimensions, in the sense that they should be explicitly taken into 
account when interpreting the results of DCL models –which is never done in the 
corresponding papers. We conclude that to be politically relevant, works on DCL do not need  
to improve the sophistication and/or the mathematical complexity of their models, but should 
consider seriously some qualitative epistemological issues about the logic of scientific 
research.   
 
3-Two absent dimensions of the debate 
 The argument we will defend here is that the current DCL models may not give an accurate 
description of what could be a theoretical optimal division of cognitive labor (first step of the 
DCL models). In particular, two dimensions are absent. First, it has to be noticed that the 
scientific field is structured as a system of hierarchical, interconnected practices motivated by 
a superposition of different kinds of objectives. Second, the epistemic significance of 
pluralism is highly dependent on the nature of the object under study, and as a consequence, 
depends on the discipline or field of research considered.  
 
a-Research objectives are embedded within various systems of practices 
 
Let us imagine a given objective O that could be taken as an example in a possible DCL 
model: the search for a treatment against a new, unknown bacterial disease D.  Let us also 
suppose that there exist two general ways to solve this problem: for instance, the search for a 
vaccine (Mv), or for a new antibiotic molecule (Ma). Each mean Mi has an estimated utility 
function, and epistemic agents are supposed to distribute their effort following different rules 
(instrumental rationality, credit, rewards, random selection etc.). These utility functions may 
be estimated, for instance, on the basis of past successes in dealing with bacteria belonging to 
the same biological class. However, this is not the end of the story. We can imagine that each 
Mi constitutes itself an objective which can be fulfilled by following distinct possible ways. 
For instance, there may exist various different methods to prepare a vaccine (by targeting 
distinct proteins from the bacterial membrane), and various techniques to find antibiotics 
(molecular screening, or rational-drug design (Adam 2005). And each of these methods 
defines a new objective, with potentially various means to achieve it. This recursive logic may 
be even more complex if we consider higher-level alternatives. For instance, the modern 
techniques and concepts used in medicine, anchored in cell and molecular biology, may be 
questioned by more holistic conceptual frames –found in some “traditional” medical 
practices. The initial objective O may then be fulfilled within two general approaches, 
anchored in opposite representations of diseases, organisms, or life itself (C1 and C2). 
Besides, it is worth noting that the competition between C1 and C2 may have an importance 
for many other objectives O –in medicine or fundamental biology. To consider this 
interlocking of objectives, we propose to invest, as a conceptual toolbox, the general 
“grammar of scientific practices” recently formulated by Chang (2014). 
 
The contemporary attention to science “in practice” (Soler et al. 2014) gives a representation 
of science, as a process, made of interconnected networks of more or less independent types 
of practices. The so-called “new-experimentalism”, notably launched by Hacking (1983), 
aims at describing in detail the heterogeneous elements entering experimental practices 
(Chang 2014). These experimental practices are considered as “hav[ing] a life of their own…" 
(Hacking 1983, p. x), independently of their hypothesis-testing role. Later, the need appeared 
to integrate representational (conceptual, theoretical) activities in the frame of scientific 
practices (Woody 2014). Following this line, the activities of epistemic agents are 
multidimensional, since this notion of practice includes “physical, mental, and “paper-and-
pencil operations””, as argued by Chang (2014) (p. 68). Chang then proposes the notion of 
“system of practices” to describe the hierarchical interlocking of “epistemic activities” 
motivated by distinct “aims”. First, in this scheme, “all scientific work, including pure 
theorizing, consists of actions” (our italics, p. 67). An action (or an activity, in Chang’s 
“grammar of scientific practices”) performed by an epistemic agent, is characterized by the 
“presence of an identifiable aim” (p. 72). To reach this aim, the agent develops “a coherent set 
of mental or physical operations (…) in accordance with some discernible rules” (Idem). This 
activity, led by “inherent purposes”, is also motivated by “external functions”. For instance, 
the act of lighting a match mobilizes a set of operations, and may be part of a more global 
plan (for instance, to light a Bunsen burner), itself constituting an activity within a larger 
system of practices (aiming to answer a theoretical question, or to find a new therapy etc.). 
The notions of “activities” and “systems of practices” are then relative, and depend on the 
scale of analyses. The important point is that each action performed by an epistemic agent is 
integrated in a hierarchical network of purposes, and is characterized by its internal 
coherence
8
. In Chang’s scheme, coherence is ensured by the success in achieving one’s end. 
More generally, we may consider that the coherence is linked to the relevance of the means 
used to reach the objective motivating the activity (or system of practices) in question. In 
other words, coherence is ensured by the deployment of instrumental rationality, leading to 
determinations of the means most adapted to the ends considered (Kelly 2003; Zollman 2018). 
Let us recall here that these activities or systems of practices may gather distinct kinds of 
(mental, physical) objectives, and then distinct kinds of means Mi: technical operations, 
setting-up of experimental protocols, formulation of new concepts or new theories, etc.  
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For a graphical representation of this hierarchical imbrication of activities, see the “commentary” on Chang’s 
work by L. Soler and R. Catinaud in Soler et al. (2014). 
 How can we apply this scheme to the question of the division of cognitive labor? As DCL 
models do, let us first consider, in a God’s eye perspective, the possibility to define a 
theoretical optimal division of cognitive labor given a certain problem to be solved (objective 
O). This resolution may be achieved by developing distinct activities. These activities are 
integrated in a system of practices, and are then defined both by their inherent purposes and 
by their various hierarchical external functions. Given this situation, two remarks should be 
made. First, inherent purposes may be divided into a variable number of underlying 
objectives. For instance, if we refer to the instance proposed at the beginning of this section, 
the search for a treatment to disease D may be considered as the general end of a system of 
practices including a first level of sub-objectives o and o’ (the search for a vaccine or for an 
antibiotic treatment). These constitute the inherent purpose of sub-systems of practices 
(including technical, experimental, or theoretical operations). We can expect that depending 
on the nature of O (technical, experimental, theoretical etc.), the thickness (the number of 
imbricated systems of practices) of the corresponding network may be highly variable. 
Finally, each DCL optimization problem is best described as a superposition of optimization 
problems.  
 
Second, a given activity may have various external functions. For instance, the development 
of an experimental technique T (e.g a method of protein extraction from bacteria) may be 
important for various possible alternatives Mv1 and Mv2 in preparing a vaccine against D. 
Besides, this experimental technique may be relevant for other systems of practices –in 
immunology, biochemistry, clinical medicine, or molecular biology. Let us imagine now that 
Mv1 and Mv2 (the “vaccine” solutions to cure D) have a lower utility function than Ma 
precisely because the protein extraction activity is not efficient. If we consider only Mv1, Mv2 
and Ma, the optimization problem will have a certain theoretical solution. This solution would 
be very different if we posed the optimization problem between Ma and T: we can expect that 
T would have a higher utility function that both Mv1 and Mv2. This is true because T is 
supposed to be important for Mv1, Mv2, and for other systems of practices. This last 
formulation would be more accurate with respect to the real state of the system of scientific 
practices. Finally, the solution of a given optimization problem varies depending on the scale 
of the analysis. “Theories”, “methods”, “approaches”, “programs” are not interchangeable 
units. Ideally, a well-posed DCL problem should consider altogether these distinct 
dimensions, reflecting the hierarchical interlocking of objectives characterizing the systems of 
scientific practices. 
 
b-The management of plurality may not be always considered as an optimization problem  
   
In the multiplicity of kinds of objectives and means taken interchangeably as basic units in 
DCL models, distinct disciplines are cited: physics (the study of critical phenomena in 
Pöyhönen 2016), chemistry (the elucidation of the structure of a given molecule or the 
opposition between phlogiston theory and modern chemistry in Kitcher, 1990), fundamental 
biology (the structure of DNA in Goldman and Blanchard, 2016), medicine (the explication of 
peptic ulcers in Zollman, 2010). These instances designate different kinds of objectives 
(theoretical, technical, experimental), but they also concern various kinds of objects. Yet, we 
argue that this generalization is biased since many scientific objects generate questions whose 
resolution cannot be considered as a common DCL problem. To make this point, we propose 
to consider the notion of complexity, classically defined as the co-existence of multiple causal 
pathways, belonging to distinct levels of organizations (Mitchell 2009). For instance, mental 
pathologies, or human behavior more generally, constitute typical complex phenomena, with 
genetic, biological and environmental causes possibility non reducible to the molecular level. 
In these cases, the question of the multiplicity of radically distinct approaches might not be 
formulated into an optimization problem: the different directions of research are better 
described as distinct heuristics than as alternative means characterized by their estimated 
utility functions.  
Let us take, for instance, as an objective O, the seek for an explanatory theory of a particular 
behavioral (normal or pathological) trait. Following Longino (2013), we can consider the co-
existence of distinct kinds of disciplines that she identifies as “quantitative behavioral 
genetics”, “socio-environmental approaches”, “molecular behavioral genetics”, and 
“neurobiological approaches” (p. vii). At the metaphysical level, this co-existence may either 
be considered as a (temporary or permanent) consequence of our cognitive limitations, or as a 
result of the existing diversity of levels of organization in nature (Ruphy 2005). In all cases, it 
is arguable that this plurality has an inherent value which exceeds the estimated efficiency of 
each approach to provide a good explanation to the behavioral trait we consider. This is due to 
the fact that, at least temporarily, all the available explanations may capture something of the 
phenomenon under study (for instance, a partial causal mechanism). In this frame, even a 
quite marginal alternative (for instance, psychoanalysis), may deserve to be pursued, because 
it may constitute a possible heuristic allowing the identification of particular causal pathways. 
This idea was defended in the case of theories of cancer. The classical, gene-centered theory, 
is currently challenged by an “organicist” one (the Tissue Organization Field Theory, Soto 
2011), and these competitive approaches may be considered as two distinct heuristics to 
exhibit the causes of cancer (Malaterre 2007). Finally, we argue that for complex objects, the 
co-existence of distinct approaches cannot be thought in the frame proposed by current DCL 
models. The alternatives may not be compared in their efficiency to reach a pre-defined 
objective. Indeed, if we accept that pluralism reflects, to some extent, the variety of causes 
determining the phenomenon at stake, then these alternatives are mutually dependent (each 
approach delivering a part of the explanation). The situation is distinct in most of the 
instances provided in the DCL literature, where each approach is supposed to have a singular, 
independent utility function.  
In the next section, we aim to show that these two absent dimensions (the hierarchical 
interlocking of objectives and the ontological limits to the DCL formalism) are missing 
dimensions. They would need to be explicitly addressed in order to interpret in a correct way 
the results provided by the DCL models.  
 
4-Why these absent dimensions are missing dimensions 
 
As most of the authors writing on DCL models, we are conscious that the very modeling 
activity inevitably presupposes the use of idealizations or simplifications which do not 
preclude in themselves their heuristic value –their ability to capture certain features of a given 
phenomenon (Muldoon and Weisberg 2011; Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014; Pöyhönen 2016). 
However, this heuristic value tightly depends on a careful work of interpretation of the results 
they provide. Here, we argue that the negligence of the elements of the dynamics of scientific 
research we considered in the previous section may generate important misinterpretations 
when DCL models try to provide advice for science policy. We think the best way to defend 
this thesis is to consider some concrete examples of DCL models whose conclusions aim to 
formulate political insights. By doing so, our objective is to show why these absent 
dimensions may constitute, very concretely, missing dimensions.  
 
a-Example 1: funding science by lottery? 
 
The first instance we will consider is that of Avin’s (forth., 2018) case in favor of the 
introduction of some random elements in the mechanism of grant allocation to scientists. 
Apart from its synthesis of qualitative arguments defending random allocation as a possible 
way to overcome the “conservatism” of peer-review (Gillies 2014), Avin proposes a 
contribution through a DCL model. Based on this model, he suggests that, given a certain 
landscape progressively explored by epistemic agents, a peer-review only based on 
instrumental rationality (selecting projects on the basis of their estimated significance) might 
be, in some cases, sub-optimal. On the contrary, a system of lottery which randomly allocates 
resources may out-perform the classical peer-review process. Intuitively, this result is directly 
linked to the fact that the epistemic landscape is not known in advance: all estimation of the 
future significance of a project may then be mistaken. On the basis of this result, he proposes 
a mechanism where a certain proportion of projects (those which do not belong to the x% best 
or worst proposals as evaluated by a first round of selecting peer-review) enter a process of 
random funding. We argue that this proposal is biased, or insufficient, since it is grounded on 
a misrepresentation of the very structure of the systems of scientific practices. The interest of 
random allocation is assessed, in Avin’s model, for the cases of poorly known epistemic 
landscape, with a great number of projects whose potential significance is difficult to 
estimate. In these (hypothetical) situations, it is quite intuitive indeed that a random 
distribution may be the most efficient way to explore the space. Avin (2018) links these 
situations to “basic research” (p. 33). In parallel, he lists some situations where “lottery should 
not be used” (p. 31). Among them, he evokes the case of projects with “bounded 
uncertainties” (where the need to obtain a quick answer, for instance under the pressure of 
“external constraints”, prevents “any significant exploration of uncertainties or open-ended 
avenues”) and of “fully explored” epistemic landscapes (where the knowledge of a given 
“area” is sufficient in yielding a good estimation of the utility functions of the project to be 
pursued). It seems to us that these two cases express the same general (qualitative) idea: when 
the problems to be solved are sufficiently clearly defined, and the significance of the possible 
research project to address them are sufficiently known (to sum up: when the epistemic 
landscape is sufficiently known), then random allocation might not be the optimal solution to 
divide cognitive labor. Following this criterion, we argue that it is not at all obvious that there 
do really exist “epistemic landscapes” adapted to such a funding by lottery. Indeed, the 
rationale behind Avin’s research policy advice lies on the assimilation of “basic research” to 
large epistemic landscapes with many “peaks” whose significance is strongly indeterminate. 
In Chang’s terms, these peaks represent possible activities, with both inherent purpose and 
external functions. As we noticed in the previous sections, these activities are embedded in 
systems of hierarchical, interconnected practices. The global significance of a given activity is 
then dependent on the partial significance of all the practices constitutive of its inherent 
purpose, and of the others systems of practices which would benefit from its development. Let 
us imagine a project P with a poorly estimated significance in a given “epistemic landscape” 
E. P, and the sub-activities it entails (e.g. the development of new techniques or experimental 
procedures), may have a clear significance for other systems of practices, corresponding to 
other “epistemic landscapes”. Its sub-activities may also have known significance within E 
itself, independently of P (for instance, if they constitute sub-objectives of other projects 
whose significance is better known). It is worth noting that P or its sub-activities may also be 
important to face some pressing external constraints – situation where, following Avin 
himself, lottery is not welcome. Finally, we argue that lottery’s argument is based on the 
hypothetical existence of many isolated projects (activities or systems of practices), whose 
significance would be strongly indeterminate. We think that the qualitative assessment of the 
structure of the systems of scientific practices suggests that the very existence of such 
“epistemic landscapes” needing a funding by lottery is not at all self-evident.  Consequently, 
we argue that the recognition of the network structure of scientific activities leads one to 
formulate research policy advice opposed to Avin’s. Random allocation is presented as a 
solution to the lack of information about the significance of proposed research projects. Our 
alternative view suggests that
 
a more exhaustive examination of the relevance of each 
research project with respect to the existing systems of practice would show that there are 
fewer cases than Avin anticipates in which the epistemic landscape is insufficiently known. 
This examination would also show that when the epistemic landscape is insufficiently known, 
the degree to which it is unknown is overestimated by Avin. Thus, the need for randomized 
funding allocation is mitigated, and perhaps evaporates entirely
9
.  
The important point is that even if Avin’s model is instructive and well-suited to describe the 
way science is funded, its normative aim (guiding the way science should be funded) might be 
impaired by the conception of the essential properties of the research process it is based on. 
Our argument may open another direction of investigation into the optimization of grant 
allocation through peer-review processes. As we suggested, one of the main epistemic 
challenges of science policy is the evaluation of the comparative interest of the proposed 
                                                          
9
This exhaustive examination may be completed, in the spirit of Kitcher  (2001), by a democratic assessment of 
the various desires expressed by ordinary citizens.  
projects. The relevance of this evaluation depends, indeed, on the knowledge we have of the 
insertion of these projects into the existing hierarchical network of interconnected practices. 
Yet, as rightly pointed out by DCL models, and notably by Avin’s model, the peer-review 
process may not be well-suited to adequately capture the current relationships between these 
systems of practice. The empirically measured lack of robustness of peer-review confirms this 
point (Graves, 2011). However, rather than through a random distribution of resources, we 
argue that a better evaluation of the interest of the proposed projects could be reached through 
a more decentralized mechanism of evaluation. As a limited panel of reviewers does not 
represent well the current state of scientific practices, an active participation of all the 
scientists actively practicing research in choosing the projects to be funded could provide a 
better knowledge of the objective interest of these projects. For instance, we propose that each 
scientist could have a right (and a duty) to choose a limited number of projects among the 
ensemble of all the propositions made by their colleagues; the projects presenting the best 
average mark would then be funded
10
. We argue that with this kind of global scheme, the 
convergence of interests (and so the estimated value of a given project) would be better 
evaluated. Obviously, this decentralization of evaluation is susceptible to be fully efficient 
only if there exist classificatory systems enabling each researcher to easily identify the 
projects which are interesting to him. Without giving a complete practical solution, we 
suggest that the use of key-words or key-expressions, similar to that developed to classify 
scientific literature in numerical bases of data, may be a fruitful direction to follow.  
 
This proposal may open interesting modeling possibilities. In all cases, DCL models, if they 
want to improve their utility in designing science policy strategies, should represent the real 
multidimensional structure of the systems of scientific practices in a more suitable way. 
 
b-Example 2: promoting “risky” strategies? 
 
A second instance of DCL models proposing explicit political insights may be found in 
Kummerfeld and Zollman (2016). The core of their model lies on a distinction between “safe” 
and “risky” alternatives, which may be “different theoretical commitments, paradigms, 
research methodologies, treatment strategies in medicine, and so on” (p. 1059). These 
                                                          
10 We may also imagine here that publics which are exterior to the scientific field (citizens, economic sphere or 
political actors) could also have their say in this process of proposing and voting for projects. 
alternatives have utility functions with respect to given, pre-determined, objectives
11
. In 
Kummerfled and Zollman’s model, a “safe” alternative is known to be the “best line of 
research”¸ that is to say the one “that has given the highest average payoff so far” (p. 1062). 
The risky one is considered as such because its (Gaussian) utility function, even if it has a 
higher mean value, is poorly known. The simulation machinery shows that when the utility 
function of the “risky” alternative has a higher mean value that the utility function of the safe 
one, the individual instrumental rationality is sub-optimal. By neglecting the risky alternative, 
individuals do not maximize the global utility of the community when distributing their 
cognitive effort.  
The authors deduce from this result that funding agencies should actively “encourag[e], in 
some situations, unpopular, risky science” (p. 1057, our italics). The central challenge to 
make this conclusion politically relevant is to delineate more precisely these “situations” in 
which uncertain projects should be voluntarily funded. We argue that this task needs to take 
into account the hierarchical interlocking of objectives structuring the systems of scientific 
practices.  
Let us note that the authors consider cases where a given choice is made to fulfill one, and 
only one, well-defined objective. Yet, as we have discussed previously, each “research 
project” at stake may have multiple external functions (Chang 2014). This is equally true for 
the sub-objectives implied by each alternative. To revisit our previous example, the 
development of a new vaccine to cure the disease D (a typical “research project” in 
Kummerfeld and Zollman sense) may be useful in other areas. For instance, it may lead to the 
chemical and physical characterization of a given protein P of the bacterial membrane, which 
is important in immunology, cell biology etc. It may also lead to the improvement of a given 
technique T to extract proteins from bacterial cells. We can suppose in this case that 
depending on the objective we consider, the “research projects” will have distinct utility 
functions. Even if the development of a vaccine is a “safe” alternative with a relatively low 
utility function (in comparison to, say, the search for antibiotics) to cure D, the knowledge of 
protein P and the improvement of T may have high utility functions relatively to other 
systems of practices (motivated by distinct general objectives). In this case, the herding of 
scientists in the “safe” alternative may be counter-productive for the problem at stake (the 
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If we follow the examples provided by the authors, these objectives may be to cure peptic ulcer, to make 
astronomical predictions of the “locations of heavenly bodies” in 1550 (by choosing between Ptolemaic or 
Copernican paradigms, p. 1063) etc.  
 
search for a treatment against D), but positive at a larger scale (relatively to other systems of 
practices). Kummerfeld and Zollman’s argument, if valuable in local contexts (that is to say, 
to solve a precise problem, or to explore a given, well-defined epistemic landscape), is harder 
to justify in more global ones (when considering the existing interconnections between the 
systems of practices). Finally, the apprehension of the situations where “unpopular” science 
should be actively promoted is certainly far for being an easy task.  
 
It could be noticed against our argument that Kummerfeld and Zollman’s model, such as the 
majority of DCL models, aims to study the optimal distribution of cognitive effort precisely in 
such local contexts, where each scientific objective is thought in isolation from the others. 
However, from the point of view of research policy, the optimization of the division of 
cognitive labor is a global problem, where all disciplines, specializations, research questions 
are to be thought together. Consequently, in their ambition to provide political insights, DCL 
models should mobilize a more realistic account of the structure of the systems of scientific 
practices.   
 
5-Conclusion 
 
The question of the relevance of social epistemology to guide research policy is a pressing 
one, as showed by the recent publishing of a volume of the Roar Transactions on this subject 
(Viola 2018). In this paper, we address it in the specific case of DCL models, which have 
flourished since the publication of Kitcher’s (1990) seminal work. These works try to assess 
what exactly is an optimal distribution of cognitive labor among researchers, and how the 
institutional conditions regulating science may contribute to its achievement. We show that 
when faced with the first question, DCL models ignore two central dimensions of the 
dynamics of science (the hierarchical interlocking of objectives and the variable epistemic 
significations of pluralism). We argue that this ignorance is problematic, since it may lead to 
misinterpretation of the results of the DCL models, and to biased policy advice. In this sense, 
they really constitute missing dimensions in the debate. This conclusion does not lead to a 
rejection of DCL models per se as epistemologically and politically irrelevant, but aims at 
figuring out some important properties of the dynamics of science that should be taken into 
account in this modeling activity.      
 
As Muldoon (2013) confesses, “there is much work left to do” (p. 124) to understand the 
“benefits and burdens of diversity” and the optimal division of cognitive labor. What form 
should this work take? We argue that the search for more refined quantitative DCL models 
should be supplemented by qualitative studies of the epistemic or psychological principles 
guiding the social organization of science, the consequences of the pressure exerted on 
individual scientists by centralized piloting, the balance between targeted and free research 
are crucial issues to inform science policy, and qualitative history and philosophy of science 
certainly have a central role to play on this matter.  
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